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“We Are No Grumblers”:
Negotiating State and Federal
Military Service in the 
Pennsylvania Reserve Division
FOR SERGEANT JOHN I. FALLER, Company A, Seventh PennsylvaniaReserve Infantry, the month of April 1864 passed splendidly. Thetwenty-three-year-old Philadelphia machinist began serving out
the final weeks of his three-year term of service inside the defenses of
Washington. In March, he wrote to his sister that he liked his duty “very
well,” and he assured her that, “I am well over from head to feet and from
the right hand to the left.” Because he chose not to reenlist in December,
Faller looked forward to returning to his parents’ house in Carlisle and
instructed his sister “to have a room fixed up for me when I get home next
summer.”1
As spring began, two important items escaped Sergeant Faller’s atten-
tion. First, he made no mention of Lieutenant General Ulysses S. Grant’s
April 17 order to suspend prisoner exchanges. A few days earlier, at Fort
Pillow, Tennessee, Confederate troops had refused to accept the surrender
of defeated African American soldiers, killing or massacring 231 officers
and men.2 Grant reasoned that if Confederate troops would not offer
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1 John I. Faller to sister, Mar. 13 and Jan. 31, 1864, in Dear Folks at Home: The Civil War
Letters of Leo W. Faller and John I. Faller with an Account of Andersonville, ed. Milton E. Flower
(Carlisle, PA, 1963), 110.
2 The exact number massacred after the surrender of the Fort Pillow garrison is unknown. A mas-
sacre definitely occurred, but the numbers killed during the battle cannot be extracted from those
killed after the fort’s surrender. The garrison had 295 white soldiers and 262 black soldiers. The gar-
rison lost 231 killed and 100 wounded, with the black units suffering the heaviest proportion of the
losses, about 170. See Albert E. Castel, “The Fort Pillow Massacre: A Fresh Examination of the
Evidence,” in Winning and Losing the Civil War: Essays and Stories, ed. Albert Castel (Columbia,
SC, 1996), 35–50 (originally published in Civil War History 4 [1958]: 37–50); John Cimprich, Fort
Pillow, A Civil War Massacre and Public Memory (Baton Rouge, LA, 2005), 85; Derek W. Frisby,
“‘Remember Fort Pillow!’: Politics, Atrocity Propaganda, and the Evolution of Hard War,” in Black
Flag over Dixie: Racial Atrocities and Reprisals in the Civil War, ed. Gregory J. W. Urwin
(Carbondale, IL, 2004), 104–31.
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quarter to surrendering black soldiers, then it was the Union army’s obli-
gation to hold Confederates taken in battle indefinitely to ensure the
safety of African American prisoners of war. Second, Faller failed to
detect the uproar in his regiment’s parent unit—the Pennsylvania Reserve
Division—regarding the War Department’s proposal to extend its term of
service beyond three years. While in winter encampment at Brandy
Station, Virginia, the other regiments of the Pennsylvania Reserve
Division had staged a near mutiny, protesting a War Department direc-
tive that proposed to retain the Keystone soldiers two to three months
beyond their expected muster-out date. Perhaps Faller disregarded this
disturbance simply because it did not matter to him whether he mustered
out in May—the month designated by the Commonwealth of
Pennsylvania—or July—the month designated by the War Department.
As long as Faller remained in Washington, he could avoid the enemy’s
bullets and merely count down the days until he went home. However, on
April 18, orders came from Major General George G. Meade directing
Faller’s regiment, the Seventh Reserves, and another regiment, the Eighth
Reserves, to join the Army of the Potomac at Brandy Station. Fourteen
days later, Faller found himself marching into the Wilderness as part of
Grant’s historic—and costly—Overland Campaign.
Perhaps, as Faller marched to the sound of the guns in May 1864, he
might have pondered the unrest that plagued the rest of the Pennsylvania
Reserve Division. The division’s mutinous behavior during the previous
month revealed a complexity of army service that historians of the Civil
War have rarely explored. The Pennsylvania Reserve Division’s remon-
stration outlined a fundamental problem besetting most Union regiments
in 1864: on what exact date did the three-year terms of service of the 1861
volunteers conclude? This question arose from an organizational dilemma
caused by the awkward progression of Northern mobilization during the
first year of the war and from the conflicting use of state and federal oaths
of allegiance to muster in Union soldiers. Scholars have yet to analyze the
contractual nature of the oath of allegiance in the minds of Civil War sol-
diers and sailors and its significance in negotiating the clumsy transition
from state to federal control of the militia. In 1861, state governors called
out their soldiers and transferred them into federal service. Amid the
zealous “war fever” that ruled the hour, eager recruits desired to reach the
front as soon as possible. They mustered into state service immediately,
but due to the haphazard mobilization process, they did not muster into
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3 Amy Dru Stanley, From Bondage to Contract: Wage Labor, Marriage, and the Market in the
Age of Slave Emancipation (Cambridge, 1998), 3.
federal service until weeks later. This left many unanswered questions, the
most important of which, perhaps, focused on the discharge of the three-
year volunteers in 1864. Because many state-organized regiments waited
for weeks—even months—to receive weapons and uniforms in 1861, and
therefore did not come under federal control until the end of the summer,
did the War Department have the right to hold them to service until
summer’s end in 1864? Did volunteers’ state service count toward their
contractual three years of military service? 
This dilemma inaugurated bitter conflict within the ranks of the
Pennsylvania Reserve Division, a unit whose state service lasted nearly
three months. The struggle between the Pennsylvania Reserve soldiers
and the War Department reveals two important aspects of Civil War sol-
diery. First, it discloses the contractual way soldiers viewed their service
to the government. When the Pennsylvania Reserves believed the War
Department had broken its agreement with them by extending their tours
of duty illegally, they rebelled, wielding rhetoric of civil disobedience and
republican scorn against executive corruption. The Pennsylvania Reserve
Division’s mutiny in 1864 confirms what historian Amy Dru Stanley con-
cluded in From Bondage to Contract, that many Unionists celebrated “a
cultural code that identified contract with personal freedom and social
progress.” Union soldiers, it seems, represented a specific population of
Northerners who glorified military contracts, the oaths of allegiance that
made them soldiers and bound them to the government.3
The importance of the government’s duty to Civil War soldiers is a
matter of some dispute. In For Cause and Comrades, James McPherson
reminded readers that Union soldiers exhibited a “consciousness of duty”
pervasive to Victorian America. He wrote, “Victorians understood duty
to be a binding moral obligation involving reciprocity: one had a duty to
defend the flag under whose protection one had lived.” Indeed, while a
sense of duty was enormously important to Union soldiers’ military serv-
ice, this concept should not be overstated. Union soldiers, as Gerald
Linderman once proved, rarely accepted a “status of powerlessness” when
joining the army. He reminded readers that Civil War–era mobilization
was premodern and that soldiers believed that “reciprocity” bound the
government to respect a volunteer’s willingness to serve and, for that mat-
ter, muster out at the end of his enlistment contract. Considering the deep
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4 James M. McPherson, For Cause and Comrades: Why Men Fought in the Civil War (New
York, 1997), 22–23; Gerald F. Linderman, Embattled Courage: The Experience of Combat in the
American Civil War (New York, 1987), 39–41; Fred W. Anderson, “Why Did Colonial New
Englanders Make Bad Soldiers? Contractual Principles and Military Conduct during the Seven
Years’ War,” in The Military in America: From the Colonial Era to the Present, ed. Peter Karsten
(New York, 1980), 42.
5 Scholarship has provided limited guidance on the importance of federalism in the Civil War
North. Not since the early twentieth century, with such works as William B. Hesseltine’s Lincoln and
the War Governors (New York, 1948) and Fred A. Shannon’s Organization and Administration of
the Union Army, 1861–1865, 2 vols. (Cleveland, 1928), have Civil War scholars uniformly inter-
preted federalism as a hindrance to Union military progress.
origins of soldiers’ contractual obligations to the government, the inci-
dents in the Pennsylvania Reserve Division appear to have been a part of
an important legacy of egalitarianism within the American military. In
studying the “contractual principles and military conduct” of New
England militiamen during the Seven Years’ War, Fred Anderson con-
cluded that enlistment contracts served as the foundation of colonial sol-
diers’ military service. Anderson stated, “[N]o contract would be changed
without the mutual consent of the parties involved. An enlistment con-
tract was no exception: any unilateral attempt to change the agreement
nullified it and voided the soldier’s contractual responsibilities.”4
Furthermore, the Pennsylvania Reserve Division’s mutiny uncovered
latent tensions that existed between federal and state governments con-
cerning the administrative conduct of the war. For the Pennsylvania
Reserve troops, the state government provided a means to subvert unjust
measures perpetrated by the War Department. While the sharing of
wartime powers rarely proceeded amicably early in the war, as the conflict
dragged on, federalism exacerbated the struggle between competing lev-
els of government. In this case, both the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania
and the War Department attempted to wield an important power—the
authority to discharge soldiers.5
During the Civil War, the federal and state governments awkwardly
shared administrative control of the Union army. In general, three types
of soldiers served: the US Regulars (the nation’s peacetime army), the US
Volunteers (federal troops contracted for the wartime emergency), and
the militia (the armies of the individual states). When war broke out, at
first it appeared that the militia would fill the bulk of the army; however,
the US Constitution provided military authorities with precious little guid-
ance when it came to managing the militia. Article 1, section 8, allowed the
federal government to “provide for organizing, arming, and disciplining,
[of ] the Militia”—meaning state militia brought under federal control—
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6 US Constitution, article 1, section 8.
7 Barry Stentiford, The American Home Guard: The State Militia in the Twentieth Century
(College Station, TX, 2002), 6–9.
8 Both the February 24, 1807, law and the February 6, 1812, law allowed the president to organ-
ize companies and regiments of “volunteers” and to appoint the field and line officers, if necessary.
But if volunteer units came preorganized—meaning with officers appointed by the governors—the
president was bound to accept them as offered. Likewise, the May 13, 1846, law specifically decreed
that unit organization and officer appointment had to follow the laws of the states. John F. Callan,
Military Laws of the United States, Relating to the Army, Volunteers, Militia, and to Bounty Lands
and Pensions (Philadelphia, 1863), 198–99, 215, 367–68.
but it did not specify how long state militia regiments could be held under
federal dominion.6 Sixty-nine years earlier, in May 1792, Congress had
made an effort to delineate the contours of federal power. Then, fearful
that “whiskey rebels” might lead a secession of the western counties of
several states, Congress had passed two militia acts that better enumerated
the president’s powers as commander-in-chief. However, even as these
acts had strengthened federal control of the military establishment, they
imposed certain restrictions on the president’s authority. Notably, section
4 of the 1792 Militia Act limited retention of the militia to a period no
longer than three months from any given year. In 1795, following the
Whiskey Rebellion of the previous year, Congress amended the Militia
Act to allow the president to mobilize state militia without legislative
authority, but this act also gave the commander-in-chief only thirty days
to relinquish control once any state legislature reconvened.7
During the War of 1812 and the Mexican-American War, Congress
granted the president temporary authority to call up another group of sol-
diers, “US Volunteers,” who could augment the federal army for a con-
tractual length of service. US Volunteers served under federal regulations;
however, during the wartime emergencies of 1812 and 1846, the federal
government granted state privileges to volunteer regiments. In
Pennsylvania, this meant that US Volunteers could organize themselves
into companies, they could elect their officers, and the governor could
commission their commanders.8 Still, by swearing an oath of allegiance to
the federal government, US Volunteers realized that, for better or for
worse, they had entered into a contractual obligation with their national
government. A sergeant who belonged to Pennsylvania’s Second
Volunteer Infantry—a unit that served during the Mexican-American
War—remembered the day he took the federal oath of allegiance: “We
have today ceased to be ‘free and independent citizens’ and are become the
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9 Between 1794 and 1862, Congress had passed legislation that enabled the president to call up
US Volunteers to augment the regular army. These statutes held Volunteers in service for the twelve
months or, in the case of the Mexican-American War, for twelve months or the duration of the war.
Two calls in the winter of 1812 allowed President James Madison to call 30,000 US Volunteers for
one year. During this call, 4,730 Pennsylvanians served as volunteers. During the Mexican-American
War, congressional legislation passed on May 13, 1846, allowed President James K. Polk to call up
50,000 US Volunteers. Although the War Department originally set Pennsylvania’s volunteer quota
at six regiments, in November 1846, the secretary of war reduced that quota to two regiments, or
2,000 officers and men. These acts from the War of 1812 and Mexican-American War lasted no
longer than the duration of their respective conflicts. Samuel J. Newland, The Pennsylvania Militia:
Defending the Commonwealth and the Nation, 1669–1870 (Annville, PA, 2002), 168–72, 199–203;
Allen Peskin, ed., Volunteers: Mexican War Journals of Private Richard Coulter and Sergeant
Thomas Barclay, Company E, Second Pennsylvania Infantry (Kent, OH, 1991), 13.
10 James Geary, We Need Men: The Union Draft in the Civil War (DeKalb, IL, 1991), 35.
property of Uncle Sam, who has the sole and exclusive right to our labor,
lives and all our energies.”9
The US Volunteer acts of 1812 and 1846 did not outlast their respec-
tive conflicts; they were temporary measures, not permanent changes to
the federal government’s mobilization policy. The federal government had
no other military statutes to direct control of volunteers until 1862, when
the manpower needs caused by the Civil War propelled Congress to pass
legislation to supervise state-level mobilization, though this too fell short
of total federal control. Drafted by Radical Republicans in the throes of
military defeat, the Militia Act of July 17, 1862, granted the federal gov-
ernment the authority to recruit African Americans for federal service
and empowered the president to demand conscription from governors if
their states did not meet troop requirements. Although highly controver-
sial and seemingly devised to increase the military powers of the presi-
dent, the Militia Act of 1862 did little to tamper with state authority.
Under this act’s provisions, state governors—and not the War
Department—had the power to execute and regulate conscription. It was
not until March 1863—nearly a year after the Confederacy had enacted
its own draft law—that Congress legalized the right of the federal execu-
tive to initiate and regulate a national draft.10
Thus, between the passage of the 1795 Militia Act and the early years
of the Civil War, military legislation primarily occurred at the state level.
Regularly, states revised or altered their military edicts to cope with local
problems arising from state defense, and Pennsylvania’s example offered
few exceptions to this trend. Like the federal Constitution, the
Pennsylvania Constitution of 1838 offered vague language in rendering
the military powers of the governor, declaring only, “He shall be com-
mander-in-chief of the army and navy of this Commonwealth, and of the
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11 Pennsylvania Constitution of 1838, article 2, section 7.
12 Near the end of the Civil War—in May and August 1864—the Pennsylvania legislature drafted
two additional expansions to the commonwealth militia law, increasing the statute to 209 sections.
Frederick C. Brightly, John Purdon, and George Coode, A Digest of the Laws of Pennsylvania from
the Year One Thousand Seven Hundred to the Tenth Day of July One Thousand Eight Hundred
and Seventy-Two, 10th ed., vol. 2 (Philadelphia, 1873), 1038–65.
13 Ibid., 1059.
militia, except when they shall be called into the actual service of the
United States.”11 During Pennsylvania’s first seventy-four years of state-
hood, the legislature generated more detailed specifications, adjusting
Pennsylvania’s militia law nine times between 1793 and 1861. Four revi-
sions came in the 1850s, and another minor amendment passed on April
21, 1861, just six days after Lincoln made his first call for troops to sub-
due the Southern rebellion. The largest alteration of the Pennsylvania
militia law occurred on April 21, 1858, and expanded the statute to more
than one hundred sections.12
Unlike vague federal decrees, state militia laws—including those from
Pennsylvania—offered complex dissertations on the proper procedures
for the enrollment, organization, provisioning, disciplining, and adminis-
tration of state-level “armies.” The 1858 revisions made it clear that
Pennsylvania held sole accountability when it came to readying its militia
for federal service. A section added during the 1822 legislative session,
and still in effect at the Civil War’s commencement, confirmed,
“Whenever any portion of the militia shall be ordered into actual service,
it shall be the duty of the governor, through the adjutant-general, to notify
the brigade-inspector, from whose brigade any such detachment may be
required, whether the call of militia so made, is by order or requisition
from the general government, or by the authority of the governor of this
state, and also the time of service for which the said detachment may be
required.” This section specified that the responsibility rested with the
governor to appoint each officer from second lieutenant to colonel, to
declare when each regiment or brigade reached a state of readiness, and
to ensure that each Pennsylvania soldier—either militiaman or volun-
teer—swore an oath of allegiance to the commonwealth before going into
federal service.13
When the Civil War began, Lincoln and his ill-prepared secretary of
war, Simon Cameron of Pennsylvania, initially offered no challenge to the
operation of state militia laws. Lincoln called for soldiers to subdue the
rebellion, but left it to state executives to raise them. On April 15, 1861,
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14 Marshall H. Van Scoten, The Conception, Organization, and Campaigns of “Company H,”
4th Penn. Reserve Volunteer Corps, 33rd Regiment in Line, 1861–5 (Tunkhannock, PA, 1885),
chap. 1.
15 The Washington Brigade formed in January 1861 under the authorization of the city council.
On March 2, Governor Andrew Gregg Curtin accepted the Washington Brigade for “emergency
service,” but did not approve its departure. On April 17, General Small claimed command of twelve
partially filled companies, seven in the First Regiment and five in the Second Regiment, perhaps
eight hundred men altogether. Frank H. Taylor, Philadelphia in the Civil War, 1861–1865
([Philadelphia], 1913), 27–9; Philadelphia Daily Evening Bulletin, Apr. 20, 1861; Scott Sumter
Sheads and Daniel Carroll Toomey, Baltimore during the Civil War (Linthicum, MD, 1997), 13–16.
Lincoln called for seventy-five thousand militia to serve for three months
under federal control. Cameron assigned Pennsylvania a quota of twenty-
five regiments—approximately twenty-five thousand officers and men.
Everywhere across the commonwealth, communities exploded with
enthusiasm. Each town, city, and village competed to be the first to meet
the president’s call for troops. Community leaders feared that if they did
not mobilize their militia with enough speed, Governor Curtin might not
select their community to represent the commonwealth among these first
twenty-five regiments. “Everywhere the wildest excitement prevailed,”
remembered nineteen-year-old Marshall Van Scoten of Montrose. Soon
to be a volunteer himself, Van Scoten recalled, “Military preparation of
guns, bell and drum filled the soul with the joy of patriotism, proclaim-
ing freedom to the masses and obedience to the majority from the
Atlantic to the Pacific. In glad response to the President’s call for volun-
teers, business was interrupted in the rural districts; flags lazily waved
along the streets to the small villages and towns of greater pretensions. . . .
Recruiting officers traveled from one prominent point to another, encour-
aging rapid enlistments; while volunteers were quickly enrolled, at first for
three months.”14
The reckless enthusiasm of the war’s first weeks made it clear that the
provisions of the Pennsylvania militia laws needed to be followed in the
strictest sense. In a foolish move, one Philadelphia officer, William F.
Small, chose to leave the commonwealth before his men possessed
weapons or uniforms. “General” Small (he gave himself that rank) took
charge of the “Washington Brigade,” two incomplete regiments organ-
ized at Military Hall, Third and Green streets. Small’s unit left
Philadelphia without orders on April 18. On the morning of April 19, his
soldiers arrived in Baltimore by train, but they could not reach the unpro-
tected national capital by rail. The unusual transportation system in
Baltimore required all travelers to detrain at President Street Station and
to make their way through the city on foot.15 Unfortunately, an enraged
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mob of Baltimore secessionists stood in the path of arriving troops. Led
by a customs officer, a mob of several hundred Baltimoreans assailed
Small’s outnumbered, unarmed force at the station, killing at least one
soldier and wounding dozens of others. During the excitement, the train
departed, leaving perhaps one hundred Philadelphians to flee Baltimore
on foot. Appalled by this embarrassing affair, the Philadelphia City
Council launched an investigation, and on May 16, it passed resolutions
of censure upon Small for his misconduct and imprudence.16
The council absolved Curtin from any blame in the incident, for he
had not approved the Washington Brigade’s departure. Small’s violation
of the Pennsylvania Militia Act demonstrated the importance of follow-
ing constitutional procedure when transferring control of the state militia
to the federal government. Had Curtin been allowed to exercise his duty
as commander-in-chief in this instance, he might have prevented Small
from taking his unarmed brigade into a dangerous city. The inglorious
disbanding of the Washington Brigade showed the thoughtlessness
involved in ordering a Pennsylvania regiment to leave the commonwealth
without first passing inspection by the governor. The legislators in
Harrisburg concurred; a revision to the state militia law, signed on April
21, reinforced the 1822 amendment that authorized only the governor to
order a regiment to depart for federal service.
On May 3, 1861, the War Department added an administrative wrin-
kle to Pennsylvania’s manpower mobilization. Lincoln and Cameron
decided to depart from the system prescribed by the militia acts of 1792.
Instead of relying on state militia, they now wanted US Volunteers to
augment the US regular army, just as James Madison and James Polk had
ordered. The president’s call of May 3 asking for a new levy of forty-two
thousand soldiers departed from the traditional policy of letting soldiers’
elections determine promotions in the militia. Instead of relying upon
enlisted men to choose their officers, Lincoln and Cameron devised a
system whereby state governors appointed them. By having appointed—
instead of elected—officers, the War Department hoped that the volun-
teer regiments would conform to a higher code of discipline than the
seventy-five thousand militia then arriving at Washington. Thus, the US
Volunteers became an administrative hybrid. Similar to the US regular
units, they fielded appointed officers, but like the militia, they were
administrated by state governments.
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17 The May 3, 1861, call for three-year troops appeared to violate the 1792 militia acts, and some
politicians openly questioned its constitutionality. One shocking incident occurred in August 1861
when the former vice president (and a future Confederate general), John C. Breckinridge, appeared
intoxicated at the camp of the First California, a regiment that had been accepted under the May 3
call. Breckinridge convinced the soldiers of Company M to stage a mutiny. In his inebriated state,
Breckinridge argued that the federal government had no legal right to muster soldiers without first
receiving consent from their state governor. For a time, it appeared that the soldiers of Company M
planned to take Breckinridge’s advice and test the constitutionality of the May 3 call, but the regi-
mental commander, Colonel Edward Baker, used his skilful oratory to diffuse the mutiny. Later, on
September 10, 1861, the Supreme Court upheld the May 3 call despite evidence against it. In July
1861, Edward Stevens, a private in the First Minnesota Infantry, demanded release from the army by
arguing that at the time of his muster Congress had not validated the May 3 call. After hearing the
private’s case, Justice James Wayne determined that Stevens had to be remitted to duty with the First
Minnesota because Lincoln’s call for troops—although illegal at the time of its enactment—could be
upheld retroactively since it had been “done for the public good.” See Gary G. Lash, “The Cases of
Private Jesse Mayberry and Captain Bernard McMahon, 71st Pennsylvania Infantry,” Gettysburg
Magazine 22 (2000): 86–87, and David M. Silver, Lincoln’s Supreme Court (Urbana, IL, 1956), 17.
18 On May 4, 1861, the day after the call for “US Volunteers,” Cameron issued General Orders
Number 15, which granted the state governors the right to appoint each officer in the US Volunteers
from second lieutenant to colonel: “The commissioned officers of the company will be appointed by
the Governor of the State furnishing it, and . . . [t]he field officers of the Regiment will [also] be
appointed by the Governor of the State which furnishes the regiment.” When dealing with
Pennsylvania’s regiments, Cameron ignored the language of this directive. Thomas M. O’Brien and
Oliver Diefendorf, General Orders of the War Department Embracing the Years 1861, 1862, and
1863, vol. 1 (New York, 1864), 32–33.
19 The Twenty-Sixth and Twenty-Seventh Pennsylvania Volunteers had once formed the nucleus
of the “Washington Brigade.” Although Governor Curtin eventually commissioned the field and line
officers of these two regiments, Simon Cameron had awarded the regimental commanders commis-
sions as early as January 1861. Cameron also personally commissioned Colonel John K. Murphy,
commander of the Twenty-Ninth Pennsylvania Volunteers, and Lincoln personally commissioned
Colonel John W. Geary, commander of the Twenty-Eighth Pennsylvania Volunteers. Reluctantly
approving Lincoln’s and Cameron’s choices, Curtin sent state commissions to Murphy and Geary.
By asking the US Volunteers to swear into federal service directly,
Cameron and Lincoln circumvented Pennsylvania’s intricate state-level
military statute.17 Lincoln and Cameron had violated other state militia
laws, but Cameron allowed the other governors the authority to appoint
their own choice of officers, a coveted patronage power. Pennsylvania pre-
sented a different matter entirely. Cameron believed that Lincoln’s call for
US Volunteers granted him the right to appoint any officers to the vol-
unteer regiments, if he felt it necessary. As a native of Pennsylvania and a
bitter rival of Governor Curtin, Cameron decided to execute this author-
ity.18 Cameron determined that Pennsylvania should provide four regi-
ments of three-year volunteers, or four thousand officers and men. He
authorized three colonels to recruit in the commonwealth, while
Lincoln—who normally abstained from such matters—approved the
fourth.19 Because these new units—the Twenty-Sixth, Twenty-Seventh,
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20 John L. Keys to Andrew G. Curtin, July 11, 1861, Record Group 19, Pennsylvania State
Archives, Harrisburg, Pennsylvania (hereafter PSA).
21 For a fuller discussion of the Cameron-Curtin feud, see Cameron’s substantial biography,
Erwin Stanley Bradley, Simon Cameron, Lincoln’s Secretary of War: A Political Biography
(Philadelphia, 1966). During the senatorial election of 1855, Cameron faced accusations of schem-
ing to win the legislative caucus. During one of the ballots, one too many votes were cast. Curtin sup-
porters accused Cameron of planting the extra vote to win the nomination by fraud. For a year,
Cameron and Curtin deadlocked, each refusing to relinquish his claim on the senate seat, but leav-
ing the seat vacant until 1856 when a new legislature appointed ex-governor William Bigler to fill
the position.
22 See note 18.
Twenty-Eighth, and Twenty-Ninth Pennsylvania Infantry Regiments—
recruited for longer terms of service, the four federally appointed colonels
filled their commands with greater speed than the state-organized three-
month regiments. When he noticed his recruits deserting to the new
three-year regiments, John Keys, a state-appointed recruiter in
Philadelphia, complained to the governor. Keys demanded some form of
confirmation to prove that his unit would eventually serve in the war. He
wrote, “[I]f we do not get through [muster] immediately I shall lose my
men inch by inch in other companies.”20 Although ostensibly a means of
raising three-year troops promptly, Cameron’s decision to call for addi-
tional volunteers no doubt emerged from his seething hatred of Curtin,
who had been his longtime political rival. Ever since the controversial
senatorial election of 1855, Curtin and Cameron had fought to control
state politics, and as the years passed and they both joined the Republican
Party, their backbiting grew increasingly mean spirited and personal and
continued until Lincoln removed Cameron from his post in January
1862.21
During the war’s first weeks, the secretary saw little chance to spoil his
Pennsylvania cronies with military commissions. As of May 3, the only
Pennsylvania officers then serving—those in the twenty-five three-month
regiments—all held commissions approved by Curtin. Not surprisingly,
Cameron’s call for three-year volunteers instantly displeased the governor,
who among offering other criticisms, questioned its constitutionality.
Under the federal militia acts of 1792 and 1795, the secretary of war could
not call upon state militia to serve longer than three months. Also, under
General Orders Number 15 issued by the War Department, Cameron
could not appoint officers, even to those in the US Volunteer regiments.22
To be legal, each officer from second lieutenant to colonel required a
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23 William H. Egle, ed., Andrew Gregg Curtin: His Life and Services (Philadelphia, 1895), 223.
24 Josiah R. Sypher, History of the Pennsylvania Reserve Corps (Lancaster, PA, 1865), 59.
25 Egle, Andrew Curtin, 223–30.
26 Batteries A, B, E, and G of the First Reserve Artillery served with the division until 1863 when
the infantry units transferred to another corps. Batteries C, D, F, and H never served with the divi-
sion. The First Reserve Cavalry received an assignment to the Department of the Shenandoah in
1862 and then another to the Army of the Potomac’s Cavalry Corps in 1863. Bates, History of
Pennsylvania Volunteers, 1:944–45, 1014–22.
commission signed by the governor or his adjutant general. Intending to
appoint officers to the three-year regiments just as he had for the three-
month regiments, Curtin requested that Cameron increase Pennsylvania’s
quota so that, as governor, he could have his share of the spoils. Instead,
on May 14, Cameron instructed him to stop organizing the three-month
regiments and transfer to the three-year regiments those who had already
enlisted. Cameron wrote that, “It is important to reduce, rather than
enlarge this number” of new regiments.23
When it became clear that Cameron would not let him appoint the
officers for the May 3 call, Curtin called for a special session of the state
legislature to ask for the formation of a state-funded “reserve division” of
fifteen regiments to serve for three years. In fact, due to a miscommunica-
tion between his office and the War Department, Curtin had already
called up twenty-five additional regiments, all to serve for three years.
Because Cameron refused to accept them, Curtin faced the embarrassment
of discontinuing these unauthorized regiments and breaking his promises
to the men he hoped to appoint as officers. To humiliate Cameron by
making him appear obstructionist to Pennsylvania’s mobilization effort,
Curtin announced to the state legislature that the War Department would
accept only a limited number of new regiments. In a shrewd speech,
Curtin pointed out that “the army of the United States [is] wholly inad-
equate for the maintenance of order and for the protection of public and
private property.” Therefore, he remarked, the Commonwealth of
Pennsylvania required its own reserve force.24 On May 15, the legislature
approved a three million dollar loan to arm and equip the “Pennsylvania
Reserve Division.” Under the provisions of the Pennsylvania Reserve Act,
Curtin retained sole authority to appoint officers in the division, includ-
ing three brigadier generals and one major general.25
Initially, the division consisted of twelve infantry regiments and one
rifle regiment distributed among three brigades. Later, Curtin authorized
a cavalry regiment and a series of artillery batteries, but these units did not
serve with the division in the field during the war.26 The companies within
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the division represented every county in the commonwealth. On May 16,
Curtin detailed state officers to establish permanent collection points for
the Pennsylvania Reserves at Harrisburg, West Chester, Easton, and
Pittsburgh. At those locations, Curtin’s agents administered an oath of
allegiance to each company when it arrived, swearing the soldiers into
service of the commonwealth. By the first week of June, all thirteen regi-
ments had taken the oath, and in late June, General Winfield Scott bor-
rowed two regiments—the Fifth Reserves and the First Rifles (also
known as the Thirteenth Reserves)—and deployed them as sentries near
Cumberland, Maryland.
The oath of allegiance to the commonwealth held especial importance
to the volunteers in the Pennsylvania Reserve Division. Not only did the
oath contractually bind its volunteers to the state government, but each
soldier now knew that his services were no longer in jeopardy of being
rejected. The oath officially made them soldiers. After several weeks of
drilling, the volunteers had a chance to prove their martial qualities to
Governor Curtin and his inspector general, each of whom had a final say
in accepting any company that applied for commonwealth service. Once
Curtin or the inspector general approved an individual company or regi-
ment, the state mustering officer administered the oath to each enlisted
soldier, one by one. The mustering officer held a Bible and read aloud the
oath phrase by phrase. Each enlisted man placed one hand on that Bible,
put his other hand in the air, and repeated the oath. On occasion, if time
was short, the mustering officer swore in each unit as a body. The text of
the Pennsylvania militia oath closely resembled that of the federal gov-
ernment’s:
I, [insert name] do solemnly swear that I will support and defend the
Constitution of the United States and the Constitution of the State of
Pennsylvania against all enemies, foreign and domestic; that I will bear
true faith and allegiance to the same; that I will obey the orders of the
Governor of the State of Pennsylvania; that I make this obligation freely,
without any mental reservation or purpose of evasion.27
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Upon completing the oath, most Pennsylvania Reserve soldiers
expressed a feeling of exhilaration, knowing that they had “passed muster”
and would, at some point, see battle. Private Ashbel F. Hill of the
“Brownsville Grays,” a company that later became Company D, Eighth
Pennsylvania Reserves, recalled, “All the boys took it [the oath] without
the least hesitation; they had offered their services to their country, and
they were in earnest. There was no ‘backing the patch.’ We were sworn
into the service of the State of Pennsylvania with the understanding that
we were subject to a call from the government at any time.”28 Private John
E. Lewis echoed this sentiment after his regiment, the Sixth Reserves,
took the commonwealth oath in Harrisburg. Lewis recalled, “On Tuesday
last our Company was sworn in to serve three years or during the war, and
not a man that passed the examination faltered. When the swearing in of
our Company was over we gave three hearty cheers that made the [State
House] building ring.”29
However, some of the soldiers who joined the Pennsylvania Reserve
Division viewed commonwealth service as a less momentous alternative
to federal service. They took the oath only because they understood that
Cameron’s policy of limiting Pennsylvania’s three-year volunteers to four
regiments made their chance at federal service highly unlikely. When
Private Hiram J. Ramsdell of the Sixth Reserves heard rumors that
Cameron would not accept his company, “The Tioga Invincibles,” he
noted how his comrades became despondent. He lamented, “It is rumored
that some of our companies will have to be sent back. Should this prove
true, there will be much dissatisfaction among the men, as of right there
should be. They enlisted with the understanding that they were really
needed, and not to gratify the ambition of a few officers, and if they have
to go back unaccepted, the blame will go where it rightly belongs,” mean-
ing the War Department. Ramsdell continued, “[A]ll have left home and
friends, simply because we thought the country demanded our services,
and we do not relish the idea of going back without a fight. The fact is,
we are ‘spilin’ for a fight.”30 Private John I. Mitchell of the same company
expressed his dissatisfaction at being unable to muster into federal serv-
ice. He wrote home, “By competent authority [we] were told ‘that the
State already had more men than it wanted or could care for’; that our
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County would not be allowed to furnish, probably, more than three com-
panies (and now it seems only two), that we would be honorably dis-
charged and might return to our homes; that men were being discharged
every day.” Unlike Ramsdell, Mitchell could not take this disappoint-
ment, and before anyone required him to take an oath, he deserted his
comrades and returned home to Tioga County. As he explained later, “We
[wanted to go] for three months; . . . But we were required to enlist for
three years [in another regiment], entirely unexpectedly to us, . . . [even
though] the proclamation of the President was only for three months.”31
For a few others, the oath of allegiance served as a last chance to nul-
lify their decision to enlist. A typical Pennsylvania Reserve regiment often
lost one or two unwilling recruits when the state mustering officer came
to administer the oath. When a few recruits got cold feet, their comrades
viewed it as dishonor to their company. A soldier from Washington
County serving in the “Hopkins Infantry,” a company that later became
Company K, Eighth Pennsylvania Reserves, took pride in the fact that no
one in his unit exhibited indecisiveness, although he could not say the
same for the other companies in his regiment. Thus, he wrote home: “We
passed inspection and were sworn in on Saturday [ June 19]. In other
companies there have been a good many men rejected, and some backing
down when it came to taking the oath; but our company passed inspec-
tion without the loss of a man, and swore through without a flinch.”32
For those who worried about missing the war, taking the common-
wealth’s military oath provided a sense of relief. On May 15, after the
companies that eventually became the Sixth Reserves mustered into com-
monwealth service at Harrisburg, Private Hiram Ramsdell noted, “We are
soldiers now. . . . We were sworn in to-day and have entered the State
service as part of thirteen regiments of Infantry, composing the reserve
corps of the State.” Curtin himself visited the camp, welcoming the regi-
ment into the ranks of the division, and he told the apprehensive soldiers
that it was his determination to make the division “the finest army that
ever trod the American soil.” Ramsdell’s earlier fear that the common-
wealth and the federal government might both refuse his services made
him skeptical of such acclamations. He wrote to his local newspaper,
“These promises are very nice and easily made. We shall see whether they
will be as easily fulfilled. But the long agony is over now, and that for
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which we have so long patiently waited has been accomplished, and as
was truly remarked today by one of our company, ‘the first battle won.’”33
Still, although Ramsdell understood the importance of taking the oath
of allegiance, he incorrectly assumed that he had mustered into both state
and federal service simultaneously, an error that would draw his comrades’
attention in 1864.34 He wrote, “We have taken the oath of allegiance to
the State and to the United States for three years or during the war, and
are to be ordered to camp either here or at some point the Governor may
designate within the State limits, subject to the order of the Federal
Government.”35 The majority of Pennsylvania Reserve soldiers, it seems,
believed that they needed only one oath to bind them to the federal gov-
ernment, even if that oath came at the state level. In the minds of the
Reserve Division’s volunteers, their military careers officially commenced
at the moment they took the oath offered by the commonwealth.
As the companies and regiments of the Reserve Division came together
in June and July 1861 to receive their weapons and equipage, Curtin asked
Secretary Cameron if he would eventually muster the Pennsylvania
Reserves into federal service. Cameron replied negatively, for he did not
want to accept Curtin’s choice of officers, particularly his four generals,
each of whom required approval by both Congress and President Lincoln.
But, on July 22, Cameron changed his mind. Following the military dis-
aster at Bull Run, Virginia, he asked Curtin to forward as many regiments
as he could to Maryland—to Sandy Hook, Cumberland, Baltimore, and
Annapolis—and to Washington without delay. Throughout July and
August, whenever one of the Pennsylvania Reserve regiments encoun-
tered a federal mustering officer, it swore out of state service, and then
swore into federal service for another term of three years. This required
the regiments to assume a new federal designation. Thus, First
Pennsylvania Reserves became known as the “Thirtieth Pennsylvania
Volunteers,” the Second Pennsylvania Reserves became known as the
“Thirty-First Pennsylvania Volunteers,” and so forth. Although redesig-
nated, the men of the Reserve Division preferred to call themselves by
their state designation. Letters home almost always bore the heading,
“P.V.R.C.,” meaning, “Pennsylvania Volunteer Reserve Corps.”
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The regiments from the Pennsylvania Reserve Division experienced an
awkward transition to federal control. For a brief period, each regiment
existed in a nebulous state of allegiance, having sworn out of state service,
but not yet having sworn into federal service. To ensure that each com-
plete Pennsylvania Reserve regiment shifted smoothly to federal control
required the US mustering officer who administered the oath to treat
each regiment with a delicate hand. Because the Pennsylvania Reserve
volunteers had been in commonwealth service for almost three months,
those soldiers who now wearied of army life possessed a legal means of
leaving the ranks. More importantly, in May and June, the War
Department had rebuffed the services of these men. The state legislature
and the governor—not the War Department—had come to their rescue.
Now, in July, Lincoln and Cameron seemed to need their services only out
of desperation, when the national capital appeared threatened. If the fed-
eral mustering officers did not act kindly toward the Pennsylvania
Reserves, they could produce mutinous sentiment.
Almost all of the Pennsylvania Reserve regiments experienced an
untidy switch to federal control. Each company possessed a handful of
men who refused to swear. Of course, their recalcitrance damaged the
good name of their company, causing those who took the federal oath to
reprimand them. When the Eighth Reserves arrived in Washington on
July 24, several soldiers refused to muster into federal service. Private
Ashbel F. Hill recalled, “Three of our boys—I am sorry to call them . . .
‘our boys’—refused to take the Oath and that night deserted, notwith-
standing that they had been sworn into State service. Their names were
Victory Jones, Robert Campbell and Thomas Grace. Thus you will per-
ceive . . . that Victory was ours no more, that our Camel (Campbell) had
run away with us, and that Grace was no more at present with us. Pardon
me for punning; but the names—they are the real names of the gentle-
men—present a temptation not to be resisted.”36
Unlike with the commonwealth oath, when the Reserve Division sol-
diers took the federal oath, they took it as a unit, not individually. Taking
the oath en mass made it difficult for unwilling volunteers to back out of
federal service; those who refused to take it incurred the public wrath of
their comrades. On July 25, the Seventh Pennsylvania Reserves reached
Washington, DC, and encamped in a shady spot north of the city. Two
days later, a federal mustering officer administered the oath. Although the
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reserves eagerly wanted to join the fray, some men refused to swear. A
Lebanon County soldier wrote that, “Yesterday (Saturday) we were mus-
tered into the United States service, when two of the [Iron] Artillerists
[the nickname for Company C, Seventh Pennsylvania Reserves]—and
two of the few Lebanon men composing the company, at that—at first
refused to take the oath of allegiance, and thus disgraced not only them-
selves, but also the company.” When the intractable men refused to swear
into federal service, their comrades threatened them with bodily harm.
Remembered a soldier from Company C, “Had it not been for the
Captain our two men [who refused to swear] would have been torn to
pieces by their companions on their return to the ranks.” In all, nine of
the Seventh Reserves’ ten companies possessed groups of men who
refused to swear. Colonel Elisha B. Harvey ordered those men to stand in
front of the entire regiment, so their comrades could get a good look at
them and perhaps bully them into rejoining their companies. Eventually,
all but one of those who initially refused to take the oath swore into fed-
eral service. When they resumed their places in the ranks, their comrades
gave them “three cheers and a tiger.” The single obdurate soldier faced
humiliation. One witness described, “The one who was bent on backing
out was shown out of the regiment between bayonets, and was afterwards
stripped of all of his clothing and run out of camp. He belonged to one
of the Philadelphia companies.”37
Generally, each regiment in the Reserve Division lost less than a dozen
men from refusals to take the federal oath—hardly enough to destroy a
unit’s fighting potential. One regiment, the Second Reserves from
Philadelphia, lost far more—nearly 50 percent of the regiment’s aggregate
strength. The mutinous behavior in the Second Reserves occurred more
from perceived mistreatment from the War Department than from inde-
cisiveness on the part of the volunteers. Once Cameron issued the order
calling the Reserve Division into federal service, on July 24, Colonel
William B. Mann, the commander of the Second Reserves, by his own
authority, ordered his soldiers to board cars at Philadelphia. His men pro-
ceeded to Harrisburg and swore out of service of the commonwealth.
Unfortunately, no US mustering officer met them there. But Mann
refused to wait, and with Curtin’s permission, he put his men on a train
to Baltimore, hoping that he might find a mustering officer in that city.
The regiment arrived at Baltimore on the afternoon of July 26, but since
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Mann had departed “on his own hook,” as one soldier recorded in his
journal, the department commander, Major General John A. Dix, refused
to accommodate his unit. Secretary Cameron then redirected the regi-
ment to Sandy Hook, Maryland, instead of Washington. Although dis-
couraged, for it appeared that Cameron intended to send them away from
the action, the soldiers of the Second Reserves boarded another train and
arrived at their new destination that night. Cameron, however, neglected
to telegraph their new department commander, Major General Nathaniel
P. Banks, to prepare for them. When they reached Sandy Hook, Banks
had made no effort to draw necessary rations. He assigned the travel-
weary soldiers to a campground where they begged nearby regiments for
food.38
Growing discontent flared up when the men of the Second Reserves
discovered that another regiment with many Philadelphians, the Twenty-
Eighth Pennsylvania, camped adjacent to them. Four companies belonging
to the Second Reserves had earlier hoped to serve under the command of
Gabriel De Korponay, a prominent Philadelphia Democrat with
European military experience. In June, Curtin had ordered Major
General George Archibald McCall, the divisional commander, to replace
De Korponay with Philadelphia’s Republican district attorney, William
Mann. Seeing De Korponay in another regiment brought back unpleas-
ant memories for the four companies of the Second Reserves that once
pledged to serve under him. Disgusted at the treatment they had received
from the disorganized federal government, groups of men in each com-
pany realized that no one could keep them at Sandy Hook. If they refused
to take the oath of allegiance, they could return to Philadelphia to reor-
ganize under a new commander, presumably the ringleader of the nascent
mutiny, Lieutenant Colonel Albert L. Magilton, a Philadelphia
Democrat. Undoubtedly, the mutiny commenced in the regiment’s Irish
companies, for not only did they have reason to despise Mann for the
organizational fiasco that unseated Colonel De Korponay, but, since he
was a Republican politician, they wanted to break free from his yoke.39
On the sweltering afternoon of August 1, the US mustering officer,
Lieutenant Colonel Fitz-John Porter, attempted to administer the oath,
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company by company. Over one-quarter of the men refused to swear and
instead registered a list of grievances. Captain Evan M. Woodward of
Company G wrote in his journal:
The reasons assigned by them was that they were armed with smooth-
bored muskets (the only ones the Government at the time could give
them,) their crowded tents, (five in each,) bad rations, (better than some
of them got at home,) not having overcoats, (in the summer,) their unwill-
ingness to serve under Colonel Mann, (their own choice,) they, in fact, like
all other men doing wrong, using every subterfuge to justify their conduct.40
Appalled at this turn of events, Porter lost his temper and directed
“injudicious remarks” at the entire regiment.41 The next morning, the reg-
iment formed again and Porter ordered all men to retake the oath; even
those who had sworn into federal service the previous day had to retake
it. Such “injudicious proceedings,” remarked Captain Woodward, pre-
dictably infuriated the men. Now, fully one-half of the regiment—476
enlisted men and one officer— refused to swear. The other officers rounded
up the mutineers, ordered them to stack arms, and unceremoniously
stripped them of their uniforms. Placing eleven officers as guards,
Colonel Mann sent them on a train back to Philadelphia. As the train
departed, the mutineers offered three cheers for Lieutenant Colonel
Magilton. Although everyone knew that a cabal of disgruntled officers
had probably organized the mutiny, there was no way to punish them, for
they had all sworn into federal service individually upon receiving their
commissions. Thus, they did not officially participate in the refusal to
swear.42
News of the mutiny surprised the people of Pennsylvania. The befud-
dled editor of the Philadelphia Inquirer could not comprehend why the
mutineers declined federal service at the eleventh hour. “It was difficult to
ascertain what these reasons were,” he wrote, “but murmurs finally
assumed the shape of ‘bad arms,’ ‘bad food,’ [and] ‘want of confidence in
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officers.’”43 Curtin expressed frustration, since the Reserve Division had
been his brainchild. Curtin was in Philadelphia when the mutineers
returned, and he held an audience with the eleven commissioned officers,
who castigated the mutineers as untrustworthy soldiers. Two weeks later,
Curtin ordered all of Philadelphia’s major newspapers to print the names,
occupations, and addresses of the mutineers with a warning to recruiters
to refuse to accept them for any new regiments. “We do not need their
services,” Curtin announced sharply, “nor do we risk our cause in their
hands.”44 Predictably, Curtin’s pronouncement carried little potency, as
recruiters needed volunteers to fill out new regiments forming in the city.
On July 22, Lincoln demanded five hundred thousand additional three-
year volunteers. In order to fill the new regiments quickly, many recruiters
accepted anyone, mutinous record or not. Over one-half of the mutineers
reenlisted during the war; one-third reenlisted immediately upon their
return to the city. Meanwhile, back at the Second Pennsylvania Reserves’
encampment, Companies B, F, G, and I disbanded, for each company had
lost over 66 percent of its enlisted men. Colonel Mann distributed these
men among the other understrength companies, and in 1862, Curtin
added three new companies to the regiment. The officers of the disbanded
companies lost their commissions and returned to the enlisted ranks.45
When the eleven officers assigned as guards returned to Sandy Hook,
they discovered that Lieutenant Colonel Porter had called the remnant of
Second Reserves into line to swear them into service for a third time.
When Porter realized that these eleven officers had not been there to take
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the oath, he flew into high passion and insisted that, for a fourth time, the
officers call the regiment into line to administer the oath so that all could
take it together. The eleven officers assured Porter that it was unneces-
sary; they had sworn into federal service by virtue of their commissions.
From then on, the men of the Second Reserves bitterly joked, “It is nec-
essary for a good soldier to carry a Bible with him to be sworn in, or he
will find himself discharged before he knows anything about it.”46
Philadelphia’s Republicans blamed Secretary Cameron and his crony-
ism for causing the mass defection. As the editor of the Philadelphia
Sunday Evening Transcript maintained, “At the bottom of the whole
transaction is Simon Cameron. He has cast disrepute on his State . . . and,
to a great degree, has served to impair the faith of the people in the
Administration of which he is a most unworthy member.”47 Although
this interpretation smacked of political bias, especially since it attempted
to acquit Colonel Mann of any misconduct and it ignored the partisan
element of the mutiny, the newspaper editor’s opinion demonstrated a
partial understanding of the problem disturbing all the Pennsylvania
Reserve regiments. As the editor noted, Philadelphia had raised a com-
plete regiment. Yet, at some point during the discomfited process of
transferring it from state control to federal control, the soldiers became
mutinous. In the editor’s opinion, it was this transfer process—caused, as
he thought, by Cameron’s hatred of Mann—that spawned the unneces-
sary discontent. He argued:
But the truth of all the defection, of which so much has been iterated, is
simply this: Col. Mann is a patriot at heart. As a Republican, he worked
with zeal . . . to secure the election of Mr. Lincoln to the Presidency. As a
true friend of Abraham Lincoln, he could be no friend of Simon
Cameron. . . . Therein lies the difficulty. Petty spleen and personal spite are
at the bottom of the whole trouble. Col. Mann would not, as an honest
man, crook the knee to Simon Cameron. The latter, needing parasites, and
bent upon making parasites of true and loyal men . . . falling in his unwor-
thy purpose, to turn his back on the State which gave him birth, and to
which he owes all that he is and can ever be—to break down everything
that can add glory to the State, and destroy all who are willing to serve the
nation without selfishness in its present hour of peril. To this end, there
was a difficulty raised as to the acceptance of Col. Mann’s regiment. It is
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true the capital of the nation, which Washington founded, was in danger.
Then enemies of the country were, indeed, at its very gates; and, by one
bold stroke could have taken it. At such a juncture, by direction of
Governor Curtin, Col. Mann moved forward. . . . Cameron had been cry-
ing “on to Richmond,” and his men had been driven back “on
Washington.” Still the Pennsylvanians under Mann determined to go, and
went to the rescue. Apparently not a moment was to be lost. In reality Col.
Mann’s command was sent to Harper’s Ferry. And there the insubordina-
tion began. The secret history of that insubordination is yet to be written.
The present is not the time to reveal the hidden motives which brought
about the trouble. It is enough to know that Colonel Mann, at a vast
expenditure of time and means, completed his regiment; that that regi-
ment elected him their Colonel; and that, after their acceptance and “mus-
tering in,” the most outrageous acts were committed to disgrace a
Pennsylvanian and deprive the country of the services of Pennsylvania sol-
diers who had volunteered to maintain its honor.48
In any case, this incident left a troublesome question: by swearing into
federal service, did the soldiers of the Pennsylvania Reserve Division
restart their three-year terms of service, or did the War Department
accept them from the moment they swore into state service in May?
Those questions remained unanswered until April 1864.
For the moment, Curtin focused his efforts on rectifying the problem
made evident by the mutiny. Now that Pennsylvania had to raise an addi-
tional eighty-nine thousand three-year men under the July 22 call, Curtin
wanted to remove any federal interference. He believed the problem with
the reserves’ muster had emerged from two simultaneous and incongru-
ous efforts by the commonwealth and federal governments. In essence,
Curtin identified federalism as the culprit. Writing to President Lincoln
on August 21, Curtin pointed out that, “The direct authority of the
Government of the United States having been thus set in competition
with that of the State, acting under its requisition, the consequence has
been much embarrassment, delay, and confusion. . . . There remains the
great evil of the unavoidable clashing of two authorities attempting at the
same time to effect the same object among the same people through dif-
ferent and competing agencies.”49
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Curtin explained that even though Congress had passed special legis-
lation on July 22 allowing the president to call for troops to serve for three
years or the duration of the war, the authority to organize, provision,
inspect, and muster troops still rested with the state governments. Curtin
admonished, “[the] law is so clearly in accordance with true policy and
expediency, it is hoped that the Government of the United States will
adhere to it.”50 Other state governors registered similar complaints, usu-
ally charging that Cameron’s cronyism had stifled mobilization in their
own states, thus sowing the seeds of his departure from the cabinet post
in January 1862. Thanks to Curtin’s forthright complaining, control of
Union mobilization remained firmly in state hands until March 1863,
when Congress passed an act that allowed the War Department to initi-
ate conscription. Four months later, the first federal draft went into effect.
By appointing federal provost marshals to regulate the draft in each con-
gressional district, the War Department took a drastic step to control
mobilization of state-level volunteers. However, administrative control of
the regiments—old and new—remained in the hands of the governors
until the end of the war. Curtin’s August 1861 demand for noninterfer-
ence from the federal government and Cameron’s subsequent dismissal
proved to be one of the principal delineators of the limits of the War
Department’s managerial control of the Union army. Still, although
Lincoln mollified Curtin by removing his political adversary, he did noth-
ing to address the constitutional issue at stake: which level of govern-
ment—state or federal—had the power to muster in the soldiers—or
muster them out, for that matter? It was the Reserve Division’s discontent
in 1864 that pushed this unresolved issue to the forefront.
The Pennsylvania Reserve Division went to the front lines in
December 1861 and fought eleven major battles with the Army of the
Potomac between then and spring 1864: Dranesville, Mechanicsville,
Gaines’s Mill, Glendale, Second Bull Run, South Mountain, Antietam,
Fredericksburg, Chancellorsville, Gettysburg, and Bristoe Station. In the
winter of 1863, as a second federal draft loomed near, the War
Department offered all its veteran soldiers who enlisted in 1861 a chance
to reenlist for three additional years, or the remainder of the war. If a
majority of any regiment reenlisted, that regiment could “veteranize,” that
is, retain its old numerical designation and its commissioned and non-
commissioned staff. Additionally, all reenlisted veterans received a thirty-
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day furlough and a $402 veteran bounty. As Colonel Martin D. Hardin
of the Twelfth Reserves remembered, “great efforts were made to get the
men, in a body, to re-enlist. Applications were made to give the division
a furlough. General [Samuel Wiley] Crawford [the new divisional com-
mander] urged the matter very forcibly, using for the first time the argu-
ment that ‘seasoned’ soldiers, as the remainder of the Reserves then were,
were so very far superior to the new levies. Also stating that the men were
mostly young and the best material for soldiers.”51 Despite these lucrative
inducements and frequent promises of a furlough, only 1,700 of the
remaining 4,300 soldiers in the Pennsylvania Reserve Division reenlisted.
Thus, not a single regiment “veteranized.”
Still, the War Department hoped if the president made another call for
troops in the summer of 1864, the soldiers who chose not to reenlist
might join new regiments that Curtin expected to organize. In the mean-
time, Cameron’s successor, Secretary of War Edwin Stanton, gave
General Grant the option to deploy all the Pennsylvania Reserves for his
upcoming campaign. Stanton set the reserves’ muster out for the middle
of the summer, the earliest on June 11 and the latest on August 10.52
By the end of the winter of 1863/64, Governor Curtin became aware
of the discrepancy between the War Department’s muster-out date and
the commonwealth’s muster-out date. On March 4, he addressed a let-
ter to President Lincoln asking for the reserves’ term of service to “be
estimated from the date of their being originally sworn into the service of
the state.” Secretary Stanton—who had grown to despise Curtin almost
as much as his predecessor had done—intercepted Curtin’s letter and
directed Assistant Adjutant General Edward R. Canby to draft a reply to
silence the garrulous governor. Canby’s message reiterated Stanton’s deci-
sion, stating that discharge dates of the reserves would be calculated from
the day the regiments swore into federal service. When Pennsylvania
newspapers learned of Canby’s message, they replied with livid denunci-
ation of Stanton and the War Department. The Harrisburg Patriot and
Union stated:
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The United States Government, under this decision, may gain a few
months service from these men at the expense of creating dissatisfaction
and losing them for a new period of three years. The treatment of our gal-
lant reserves, on the part of the government, has been shameful ever since
they entered Washington four days after the battle of Bull Run. . . .
Nothing short of annihilation would seem to be the fate of the gallant
Reserves.53
The soldiers also grasped the dilemma. The War Department meant
to squeeze one more bloody campaign out of the Reserve Division before
sending it home. Fearing that their lives would be cut short by this red-
tape technicality, they replied with irate vitriol. Corporal Adam S. Bright,
a Pittsburgher in the Ninth Reserves, wrote to his uncle that:
The impression is now that we will not be discharged before the middle
of July. Old Ed Stanton is stubborn and refuses to let us off. Governor
Curtain [sic] is doing all he can to get us off in May, but Stanton has an
old grudge against Curtain and is going to take it out on the Pennsylvania
Reserves. I’m sorry we can’t have a sane man for Secretary of War. The
Penna. Reserves will remember Stanton. If he was here they would shoot
him quick as they would a Reb.54
Naturally, the disgruntled Pennsylvania Reserve soldiers looked to
Governor Curtin for support. Curtin—now widely renowned as the “sol-
dier’s friend” for his tireless efforts to support military families—had long
applauded the division for its battlefield prowess and had made strenuous
efforts to reunite the errant Second Brigade, then stationed in
Washington and Alexandria, with the rest of the division. One discon-
tented soldier wrote the governor, “Knowing you to be the soldiers friend
we place great confidence in you.” Similarly, a Pennsylvania Reserve offi-
cer wrote, “We appeal to you because you first conceived us, brought us
into existence, our military father, and have at all times protected and
defended us against assault.” One soldier humbly concluded an infuriated
protest letter with: “If I have offended in writing thus to you, I ask your
pardon.”55
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In their denunciations of the War Department’s decision, the
Pennsylvania Reserve soldiers couched their arguments in a language of
citizens’ rights, arguing that by extending their tours of duty the federal
government had broken its contract with the men. In a letter to Governor
Curtin written on April 10, 1864, an anonymous soldier wrote, “We
enlisted on the fifteenth of May [18]61 and was not sworn into the
United States Service till the 28th of July[.] [N]ow I ask you is that act-
ing fair with us[,] keeping us till that time[?] [A]re we to loose two
months and better[?] I say no and the Div says no[.] [W]e will fight for
our wrights if need be[.] [W]e have done our duty as well as we knowed
how so far but we will do no more after the 18th of May[.] [T]hat is the
voice of our Division.” Private James Thompson of Company E, Ninth
Reserves, warned Governor Curtin correspondingly, writing on April 20
that “should the Secretary of War attempt to keep us longer [than May
15] he may have trouble with us for we are determined that our rights
shall not be disregarded by any man or set of men or my government.”
When Sergeant William P. Sprague, Company K, Ninth Reserves, who
expected to be mustered out on May 4, learned that he would have to wait
until July 28 to start for home, he stated, “We consider . . . [it] an act of
injustice to us, hence the dissatisfaction.”56
Thirty-four officers from two regiments in the Pennsylvania Reserve
Division—the Tenth and Eleventh Reserves—drafted formal resolutions
and sent them to Curtin on April 12 and 13. These two sets of resolutions
argued that the retention of the reserves longer than three years “would
be highly unjust to ourselves and the men under us; [we] desire to make
known to your Excellency our emphatic disapproval of such a measure
and moreover to petition that there may be some action taken on it at
once.” The officers of these regiments argued that the federal mustering
officer “had nothing whatever to do with our time, that we would be
governed altogether on this point by our State Muster,” and that, by the
transfer to federal authority, “we took no new oath or bound ourselves to
no new term of service.” Although the officers admitted that they had
acted “hasty” by not settling the question of their muster-out date in
1861, at the time, they felt it incumbent upon themselves “to take
advantage of . . . our zeal to render our country service in its darkest hour,
yet we never for a moment suspected that justice would be any the tardier
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in a recognition of our services.” Thus, the Pennsylvania Reserve officers
believed that extension of their terms of service nullified or impugned the
patriotism that had compelled them to enlist in 1861.57
Even though the Pennsylvania Reserve soldiers hinted that they would
mutiny if ordered to serve until July or August, they simultaneously reaf-
firmed their patriotism and devotion to the cause, which they claimed had
not dissipated since 1861. A letter written to Governor Curtin by “many
privates” in the Sixth Reserves stated, “We are no grumblers, and you will
please bear in mind the fact that the sentiment of the Penn’a Reserve
Corps is that a gross imposition is about to be practiced upon us and the
occasion or excuse the officials have for it is ignorance—We protest
against it.” These soldiers warned that they would not abide by their
newly scheduled muster-out date of July 27, but would “lay down their
arms [on May 15] when their term of service expires counting from the
date of their enlistment.” Private George W. O’Donnell, a Philadelphian
in Company G, Fourth Reserves, argued likewise, suggesting that extending
his unit’s term of service to July 17 cheapened the duty he had already
done. His company had sworn into commonwealth service on May 29 at
the Girard Hotel, and O’Donnell maintained that, “We needed no other
oath to bind us to the United States; for we did not enlist to make street
parades and make a show of ourselves around the city, but to do our coun-
try service, which we have done; or tryed to do.” O’Donnell argued that
when his company mustered into federal service, it took no specific oath
binding it to a muster-out date of July 17, but merely “transfered into [the
service of ] the United States.” He added, “I am of the opinion that what
Laurels we have won will be thrown away; it is a shame when men serves
NEGOTIATING STATE AND FEDERAL MILITARY SERVICE 4752011
58 “Many Privates” to Andrew Curtin, Apr. 11, 1864; and George W. O’Donnell to Andrew
Curtin, Apr. 18, 1864, PSA.
59 “Many Privates” to Andrew Curtin, Apr. 11, 1864, PSA.
60 Ibid; George W. O’Donnell to Andrew Curtin, Apr. 18, 1864, PSA.
their time out faithfull, and then to be trampled upon.”58
By referring to their division’s past glories in their protest to Governor
Curtin, the privates of the Sixth Reserves made it clear that the federal
government had soiled their 1861 patriotism:
History will tell how we have done our duty—The skeleton Regiments,
the tattered banners of the Division and the absence of many dear, famil-
iar faces, whose bones are bleaching on the inhospitable soil of “old
Dominion” will testify our devotion to that flag, under whose folds we
were born and shall it be said that the State of Pennsylvania permitted an
outrage of this kind to be practised upon that Division upon which the
safety of the capitol of the nation depended at the outset of the war, and
the only representative Division of the State in the Army of the United
States.59
However, the Pennsylvania Reserve did not only denounce what they
perceived as threats to their honor. They also expressed concern about the
administration’s ability to maintain law and order in the wake of this out-
rage. If the War Department held the reserves until July, the survivors,
many believed, would return home and refuse to reenlist in any of the new
regiments then organizing in Pennsylvania. George O’Donnell pointed
out that his regiment, the Fourth Reserves, had over three hundred men,
and he believed, if not mustered out as soon as possible, “instead of being
a profit to the Government,” it would become a “loss.” The privates of the
Sixth Reserves warned that if the War Department “would let us go at the
proper time, two thirds of the ‘Old Guard’ would find their way again into
the army, [but] if they hold us, every man will feel himself aggrieved and
will not hesitate to say so. Even now that is the common talk.”60
Filling a body of seasoned veterans with an angry resolve seemed like
an imprudent idea, especially considering Pennsylvania’s turbulent inter-
party competition. Colonel William McCandless, a brigade commander
in the reserves, considered the “vexed question” a matter of common
sense. Writing to Curtin on April 13, he pointed out, “There is another
matter which I suppose has not escaped your attention. I.E. the necessity
for maintaining the military spirit of the State in order that we may evade
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future drafts.” McCandless suggested that the state legislature draft
another bill to create a second reserve division to catch the common-
wealth’s deserters and draft dodgers. He supposed the discharged soldiers
of the Pennsylvania Reserve Division would form a good nucleus for this
new body of state troops, but he pointed out, the veterans would only join
if they mustered out in May.61
Pennsylvania Reserve soldiers also took pains to point out that their
votes would be critical in the upcoming presidential campaign. Private
James Thompson considered it a “sorrowful day for us to oppose any
measure of the Administration,” but if left so distraught by the
Republican Party, all of the loyal soldiers in the Pennsylvania Reserves
would certainly vote against Lincoln in November. On April 25, Major
Richard Ellis, commander of the Second Reserves, cautioned Governor
Curtin that, if the War Department held the soldiers in his regiment after
May, “they will be turned from ardent supporters to violent opposers of
the Administration, National and State. Hold this Division in service to
August, and they will carry the State against the Administration next fall
in spite of fate—So much for politics.”62 Major Ellis wrote a letter to
Secretary Stanton the next day, asking him to reconsider his opinion,
again stating that extension of the reserves’ service would change his men
“into violent opposers of the Administration.” Ellis added:
I am particularly anxious with reference to this matter, as I was a member
of the [Republican] Convention at Chicago, that nominated His
Excellency, the President, and I desire to see him reelected. The men of
this Division are of a superior class, and would wield a powerful influence
in the State, and will be driven into the ranks of the opposition by retain-
ing them in service after the time which they honestly believe they are
entitled to their discharge. I regret to say, that I have frequently heard
expressions of opinion of this kind from gentlemen who have heretofore
been our warm political friends.63
Neither did unrest in the Reserve Division escape the attention of
politicians on the home front. William Daniel of Canonsburg, whose
town had raised the “Jefferson Light Guards,” now known as Company
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D, Tenth Reserves, believed the Canonsburg company should receive its
discharge on May 15 rather than July 21. In his opinion, Daniel consid-
ered it quite unfortunate that the Republican Party would choose to ruin
its reputation this way, especially after Curtin had so narrowly won the
gubernatorial election in October 1863. Daniel believed that angering the
reserves would risk losing Canonsburg to the Democrats and hinder the
town’s ability to meet its draft quotas. He guessed many of the reserves
“were very much wedded to the fortunes of the late Gen McClelland, but
I think they have all got over that now, sinse his imputation on them at
Mechanicsville. If those men were permitted to come home at the expi-
ration of their Com[monweal]th Servise . . . I have no doubt they would
reenlist allmost to a man, but if the attempt is made to throw out the time
they were in the Servise of the State; I fear many of them will not.”64
Meanwhile, the commanders of the Pennsylvania Reserve Division
faced a different problem: keeping discipline and preventing unrest from
spreading to sympathetic units in the Army of the Potomac. On April 21,
six companies of the Sixth Reserves stacked arms and refused to perform
duty. The officers of Dauphin County’s Company G brought their muster
roll to their brigade commander, Colonel McCandless, showing him that
their three years had elapsed. McCandless ordered all the mutineers
arrested and preferred charges against the ring leaders. He also addressed
Curtin, demanding that the governor take action. He wrote, “If this
[action by the War Department] is persisted in it will place us in a dis-
reputable position, and all our hard fighting will have gone for naught.”
Colonel William Cooper Talley, commander of the First Reserves, wrote
Curtin the next day, upholding McCandless’s decision. “Every attempt of
disobedience will be promptly and firmly met,” he wrote. “This, however,
is only the beginning of the trouble. The cause should be removed, full
justice should be done to the men; it is our duty as officers to use all our
efforts to accomplish this.” Talley urged Curtin to seek a personal audi-
ence with the president, because Talley guessed, “Our only hope is that
you cause the President (who has the power) to see the necessity of his
prompt action in the matter. . . . [T]he least disturbance among us [offi-
cers] would be magnified into mutiny by those who would be pleased to
have an opportunity of staining our character.” On April 24, Major
General George G. Meade, commander of the Army of the Potomac and
also an old commander of the reserves, wrote to Curtin, adding his
--
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endorsement of an early discharge: “My experience is decided that it is
inexpedient and impolitic to retain men beyond the period which they
honestly believe they are entitled to a discharge. . . . It is of the utmost
importance that a speedy decision be made as there are symptoms of dis-
order and mutiny appearing in this command.”65
On April 25, armed with this support, Curtin went to see President
Lincoln and agitate for the release of the Reserve Division. Curtin’s audi-
ence with the president yielded success, and the Philadelphia Inquirer
declared, “Every difficulty existing between the Commonwealth of
Pennsylvania and the National Government has been removed.” Upon his
return to Harrisburg, Curtin told Pennsylvania’s citizens that the reserves
would muster out in May. To ensure that Lincoln’s promise stuck,
Representative Thomas J. Barger, a Philadelphia Democrat, drafted reso-
lutions soliciting President Lincoln for a timely release of the
Pennsylvania Reserves. On April 29, the legislature unanimously adopted
Barger’s resolutions.66
On May 3, Major General Gouvernor Kemble Warren, the com-
mander of the Fifth Corps of the Army of the Potomac, drafted orders
returning the Reserve Division to Pennsylvania. Unfortunately, the order
came one day too late. The Army of the Potomac struck tents that same
day and crossed Germanna and Ely’s Fords on the Rapidan River on its
way to engage the Army of Northern Virginia. Over the next twenty-
eight days, the reserves fought in a series of six battles—The Wilderness,
Spindle Hill, Spotsylvania, Guinea’s Station, North Anna River, and
Bethesda Church—sustaining 1,116 casualties. On May 5, the Seventh
Reserves suffered the heaviest loss when two companies of the Sixty-First
Georgia Infantry surrounded them in the Wilderness, forcing 273 officers
and men to surrender.
Two Reserve Division regiments—the Eighth and Ninth Reserves—
departed the front lines after the Battle of Spindle Hill and mustered out
in Pittsburgh on May 24 and 13, respectively, the first two to be released
from service. On May 31, staff officers read Warren’s farewell orders to
the rest of the division. On June 3, the surviving Pennsylvania Reserves
marched to White House Landing, boarded transport ships, and on June
6, they sailed into Harrisburg. The survivors met a grand reception at the
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capitol and received a public thanks from Governor Curtin. Four regi-
ments mustered out in Harrisburg, three took cars to Philadelphia and
mustered out there on June 14 and 16, and two more regiments journeyed
to Pittsburgh and mustered out there on June 11. The 1,700 soldiers who
reenlisted in December 1863 remained in Virginia and reorganized as the
190th and 191st Pennsylvania Infantry Regiments (also known as the
First and Second Veteran Reserves).67 They participated in the Battles of
Cold Harbor, Petersburg, Weldon Railroad (in which 600 of them were
captured), Poplar Springs Church, Hatcher’s Run, White Oak Road, and
Five Forks.
Only one regiment did not completely muster out: the Seventh
Reserves. Instead of going home, the captured enlisted men took a long
train ride to Andersonville, Georgia, where sixty-seven of them died.68
Thirty-three men from Sergeant John I. Faller’s Company A entered the
stockade, but only nineteen came out at the end of the war. As he squat-
ted in filth and misery, ridden with scurvy, watching his teeth fall out
daily, maybe Sergeant Faller considered the curious set of circumstances
that plucked him from his cushy assignment in Washington at the
eleventh hour of his term of service and extended it long enough to get
him captured. Maybe he even pondered the clumsiness of the transfer to
federal control that lay at the root of his dilemma and subsequent
anguish. But, in the words of the soldiers of the Sixth Reserves, Faller
“was no grumbler”; he solemnly did his duty inside the stockade. As long
as he remained a breathing prisoner of war, the Confederacy had to
appoint soldiers to guard him. By merely surviving, Faller continued to
serve his country. Then, in the autumn, Faller received another opportu-
nity to take an oath of allegiance, this time to the Confederacy; the guards
promised to give him food and clothing if he chose to switch sides. Faller
did not accept. According to him, he and thousands of other inmates
“remained faithful to their flag, although food and clothing and life were
offered to them to betray their country.”69
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Like many other soldiers in the Reserve Division, Faller considered
oath-taking a serious business. In 1861, the Pennsylvania Reserve
Division volunteers viewed the commonwealth’s oath of allegiance as the
moment they became soldiers, as an inviolable contract that protected
them from abuse of power, in this case, from federal supremacy. Of
course, the War Department had its own interpretation of the oath of
allegiance, viewing the federal oath as the true and official declaration of
one’s duty to his country. This discrepancy in interpreting the oaths ulti-
mately produced the mutinous sentiment of 1864. Had both levels of
government solved their constitutional problems in 1861, they might
have avoided this unpleasant blemish on the division’s stellar war record.
In any event, the maladroit sharing of military power between
Pennsylvania and the War Department produced a substantial amount of
grumbling.
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